

Message Text

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EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR,AO

SUBJECT: ACTION MEMORANDUM: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS FOR SECRETARY'S APPEARANCE BEFORE CLARK SUB-COMMITTEE, JANUARY 29.(S/S NO. 7601375)

FOLLOWING ARE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS FOR USE AT SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, JANUARY 29

QUESTION:

WHY SHOULD THE MPLA NOT BE RECOGNIZED AS THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF ANGOLA? TWENTY-THREE AFRICAN STATES HAVE RECOGNIZED THE MPLA REGIME WHILE NONE HAVE RECOGNIZED FNLA/UNITA. ONE IMPORTANT TEST OF WHETHER A REGIME SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED IS THE DEGREE OF INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT IT ENJOYS AND THE MPLA IS FAR AHEAD OF ITS RIVALS.

ANSWER:

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THE AFRICAN STATES THAT RECOGNIZED THE MPLA CONSTITUTE ONLY HALF OF THE OAU MEMBERS. IN THE LARGER INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, MPLA ENJOYS THE RECOGNITION OF ONLY THE COMMUNIST STATES, FOUR LATIN AMERICAN STATES AND TWO NATIONS

IN OTHER AREAS. BY NO STRETCH OF THE IMAGINATION CAN IT
YET BE SAID THAT THERE EXISTS AN INTERNATIONAL CONSEN-

SUS THAT MPLA IS THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT OF ANGOLA.
THOSE AFRICAN NATIONS THAT RECOGNIZE MPLA DID SO IN CON-
TRAVENTION OF ESTABLISHED OAU POLICY THAT NO SINGLE
FACTION SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED AS THE GOVERNMENT OF ANGOLA
SINCE ALL THREE ANGOLAN MOVEMENTS HAVE THE RIGHT TO PAR-
TICIPATE IN GOVERNMENT.

THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS THEMSELVES AND PORTUGAL, THE FOR-
MER COLONIAL POWER, FORMALLY AGREED A YEAR AGO THAT ALL
THREE MOVEMENTS SHOULD SHARE POWER UNTIL INDEPENDENCE
AND THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF INDEPENDENT ANGOLA WOULD BE
DECIDED BY ELECTIONS. THE MPLA VIOLATED THIS AGREEMENT
AND IT IS THE MPLA THAT STILL REFUSES TO LIVE UP TO ITS
COMMITMENT.

QUESTION:

THE MPLA APPEARS TO BE THE BEST QUALIFIED OF THE ANGO-
LAN LIBERATION GROUPS, THE MOST DYNAMIC AND ALSO SEEMS
DESTINED TO WIN THE MILITARY STRUGGLE. WHY DO WE NOT
ACCEPT REALITY AND STOP SUPPORTING A BUNCH OF LOSERS? IT
WILL ONLY GAIN US ILL WILL AND WE WILL BE WITHOUT INFLU-
ENCE IN A COUNTRY WHERE WE HAVE CURRENT ECONOMIC INTERES-
TS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF DOING MUCH MORE?

ANSWER:

MPLA DOES HAVE IN ITS RANKS SOME OF THE BEST EDUCATED AND
MOST HIGHLY QUALIFIED LEADERS AND TECHNICIANS BUT THIS
BEGS THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE, WHICH IS THE RIGHT OF
FNLA AND UNITA TO PARTICIPATE IN THE GOVERNMENT, AND IG-
NORES THE FACT THAT UNITA AND FNLA REPRESENT A MAJORITY OF
THE ANGOLAN PEOPLE, AND ALSO INCLUDE UNIVERSITY-TRAINED,
EDUCATED LEADERS. AS FAR AS THE MILITARY STRUGGLE GOES,
MPLA DID NOT TALK IN TERMS OF IMPOSING ITS WILL ON THE
NATION UNTIL MASSIVE SOVIET ARMS SHIPMENTS BEGAN IN THE
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SPRING OF 1975. ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS ARE NOT IMPOR-
TANT TO OUR PRESENT POLICY IN ANGOLA. US INVESTMENT IS
NOT LARGE; POTENTIAL THERE IS FOR DEVELOPMENT, BUT THERE
IS ALSO LITTLE CHANCE THAT ANGOLA WILL BE "LOST TO THE
WEST." THE ITEMS THAT ANGOLA NOW PRODUCES -- PETROLEUM,
COFFEE, DIAMONDS -- CANNOT EASILY BE ABSORBED ANYWHERE
BUT IN THE WEST. THE LARGE INVESTMENTS THAT ANGOLA NEEDS
TO DEVELOP ITS MINERAL RESOURCES CAN COME ONLY FROM
WESTERN EUROPE, JAPAN OR THE UNITED STATES, SO THAT
ANGOLA WILL PROBABLY REMAIN OPEN TO THE WESTERN WORLD.

QUESTION:

IN LIGHT OF ITS LONG ESTABLISHED POLICY IN SUPPORT OF

INDEPENDENT BLACK AFRICAN STATES, HOW CAN THE UNITED STATES ALLY ITSELF WITH SOUTH AFRICA? SOUTH AFRICAN INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA ON THE SIDE OF THE FNLA/UNITA HAS ALIENATED SOME BLACK STATES THAT WOULD OTHERWISE HAVE REMAINED NEUTRAL. WE ARE GUILTY BY ASSOCIATION WITH SOUTH AFRICA.

ANSWER:

THE UNITED STATES WAS NOT, AND IS NOT NOW, ALLIED WITH SOUTH AFRICA. THE SOUTH AFRICANS ACTED ON THEIR OWN INITIATIVE, WITHOUT CONSULTATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES THOSE WHO WOULD JUSTIFY MASSIVE SOVIET-CUBAN INTERVENTION AS RETALIATORY TO THE SOUTH AFRICAN INVOLVEMENT ARE CLEARLY IGNORING THE COURSE OF EVENTS. THE SOUTH AFRICANS ENTERED INTO THE ANGOLAN FRAY MANY MONTHS AFTER THE SOVIET-CUBAN BUILD-UP BEGAN.

QUESTION:

WHY, IF ANGOLA IS NOT IMPORTANT TO US, DO WE WASTE OUR RESOURCES AND GOOD WILL THROUGH AN INVOLVEMENT THAT IS NOT UNDERSTOOD, AT BEST, AND WHICH IS DETESTED BY MANY PEOPLE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD?

ANSWER:

WE ARE NOT IN A POPULARITY CONTEST AND WE SHOULD ACT IN

OUR OWN BEST INTERESTS. EVEN IF ANGOLA IS NOT IMPORTANT TO US, THE SOVIET UNION MUST LEARN THAT IT CANNOT FLOUT WITH IMPUNITY THE SPIRIT OF DETENTE. DETENTE BETWEEN
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THE UNITED STATES AND THE USSR OPERATES AT SEVERAL LEVELS AND ONE OF THESE HAS TO DO WITH SELF-RESTRAINT. IF THE RUSSIANS ARE NOT BLOCKED IN ANGOLA, THEY MAY WELL MISTAKENLY SEEK NEW AREAS OF AGGRANDIZEMENT THAT WILL LEAD THEM INTO A MORE DIRECT AND MORE SERIOUS CONFRONTATION WITH THE UNITED STATES.

QUESTION:

IS IT NOT TRUE THAT ESCALATION OF FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA WAS TRIGGERED BY THE U.S. IN JANUARY 1975 AND NOT BY THE SOVIET UNION?

ANSWER:

IN THE FALL OF 1974, THE SOVIET UNION RESUMED ITS ARMS SUPPLIES TO THE MPLA. THE U.S. WAS AWARE OF THIS, BUT DID NOT RESPOND IN KIND, EVEN THOUGH IT HAD BEEN APPROACHED. THE MEASURE OF SOVIET TRAINING AND SUPPLIES IS INDICATED BY THE FACT THAT BY THE SPRING OF 1975, THE MPLA'S MILITARY FORCE HAD INCREASED FROM ABOUT 3,600 MEN (ITS LEVEL IN THE FALL OF 1974) TO 10,000 MEN. IN ADDITION THE WHEREWITHAL HAD BEEN PROVIDED TO RECRUIT FOR THE MPLA 4,000 KATANGAN EX-GENDARMES WHO, AS TSCHOMBE SUP-

PORTERS, HAD TAKEN REFUGE IN ANGOLA. IN JANUARY 1975, THE U.S. CONTRIBUTED US DOLS. 300,000 TO THE FNLA. (DURING THE TWELVE MONTH PERIOD JULY 1974 TO JUNE 1975, SWEDEN GAVE THE MPLA OVER US DOLS. 1.4 MILLION.) U.S. FUNDS WERE INTENDED AND USED SOLELY FOR POLITICAL SUPPORT. THEY WERE DISTRIBUTED OVER A PERIOD OF SEVERAL MONTHS AND EMPLOYED BY THE FNLA FOR SUCH THINGS AS THE PURCHASE OF A NEWS-PAPER IN LUANDA, OFFICE SPACE, SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT, AND BICYCLES FOR THE FNLA'S POLITICAL ORGANIZATION. IT IS DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT THE SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN THE SOVIET UNION'S MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN THE FIRST HALF OF 1975 COULD BE JUSTIFIED ON THESE GROUNDS. CERTAINLY THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOT REACTING TO U.S. ARMS AID TO THE FNLA AND UNITA, FOR AT THIS TIME THERE WAS NONE.

QUESTION:

HASN'T THE ADMINISTRATION CHANGED THE RATIONALE FOR ITS ACTIONS IN THE ANGOLAN SITUATION?

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ANSWER:

WE HAVE NEVER BEEN OPPOSED TO THE PARTICIPATION BY THE MPLA IN AN ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT. CONSISTENTLY WE HAVE ADVOCATED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A GOVERNMENT REPRESENTING

ALL THREE FACTIONS. OUR CONSULATE GENERAL IN LUANDA DEALT WITH THE MPLA AS ONE OF THE THREE LEGITIMATE MOVEMENTS IN ANGOLA AND HAD A GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MPLA LEADERSHIP. ALL ALONG, OUR CONCERN HAS BEEN NOT WITH THE MPLA, BUT WITH THE EXTENT OF SOVIET, AND LATER CUBAN, INTERVENTION AND THEIR EXPRESSED AIM TO DENY TO THE OTHER TWO GROUPS ANY PART IN THE GOVERNING OF ANGOLA.

I SAID ON DECMEBER 23: "...THE ISSUE...IS NOT WHETHER A PRO-SOVIET FACTION IS BECOMING DOMINANT IN ANGOLA. THE UNITED STATES POLICY UNTIL WELL INTO THE SUMMER WAS TO STAY OUT OF ANGOLA, TO LET THE VARIOUS FACTIONS WORK OUT THEIR OWN ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN THEMSELVES. WE ACCEPTED IN MOZAMBIQUE WITHOUT ANY DIFFICULTY A PRO-MARXIST FACTION THAT HAD COME TO POWER BY INDIGENOUS MEANS, OR PERHAPS WITH SOME MINIMUM OUTSIDE SUPPORT, IN THE FRELIMO. WHAT HAPPENED BETWEEN MARCH AND THE MIDDLE OF THE SUMMER WAS A MASSIVE INTRODUCTION OF SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT, WHICH WAS THEN FOLLOWED BY SOVIET ADVISORS AND LARGE NUMBERS OF CUBAN TROOPS."

QUESTION:

ARE ANY AMERICAN MERCENARIES INVOLVED?

ANSWER:

WE COULD NEVER BE CERTAIN THAT SOME FREELANCE AMERICAN

MERCENARIES ARE NOT IN ANGOLA. WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE ONE WAY OR THE OTHER. BUT NONE HAS BEEN RECRUITED, HIRED, TRAINED, PAID OR TRANSPORTED BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. ON JANUARY 2, 1976 A WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN SAID, "NO AGENCY OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS USING AMERICAN MERCENARIES IN ANGOLA, NOR IS ANY U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCY RECRUITING, HIRING OR TRAINING AMERICAN MERCENARIES."

QUESTION:

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ARE WE TRAINING ANY FOREIGN MERCENARIES?

ANSWER:

WE ARE, OF COURSE, GIVING ASSISTANCE TO THE FNLA AND UNITA. SOME OF THE FUNDS INVOLVED ARE USED FOR THE PAYMENT OF SALARIES OF THE FORCES FIGHTING FOR THE TWO GROUPS, INCLUDING BLACK AND WHITE ANGOLANS, PORTUGUESE AND PERHAPS OTHERS.

QUESTION:

ARE THERE ANY AMERICAN ADVISORS IN ANGOLA?

ANSWER:

NO. WE HAVE DONE OUR UTMOST TO KEEP AMERICAN CITIZENS FROM

BEING DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE ANGOLAN STRUGGLE. THERE ARE, AT A GIVEN TIME, A FEW OBSERVERS IN THE BATTLE AREAS, BUT THEIR ONLY FUNCTION IS TO OBSERVE AND REPORT ON THE MILITARY ACTION. THEY IN NO WAY GIVE MILITARY ADVICE TO THE FNLA OR UNITA. THERE ALSO IS AN AMERICAN RADIO TECHNICIAN IN ANGOLA ASSISTING UNITA IN BOOSTING THE STRENGTH OF ITS RADIO TRANSMISSIONS.

QUESTION:

WHY WASN'T THE U.S. COVERT OPERATION CLEARED WITH THE CONGRESS?

ANSWER:

IT WAS. AS I SAID IN MY DECEMBER 23 PRESS CONFERENCE: "CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES WERE BRIEFED ON 25 SEPARATE OCCASIONS ABOUT WHAT WE WERE DOING IN ANGOLA. EVERY STAGE OF ADDITIONAL EXPENDITURES WAS PUT BEFORE THE SIX CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES THAT HAVE SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITIES. IN ADDITION, TWO INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES WERE BRIEFED."

BETWEEN JULY AND NOVEMBER 1975, THE CHAIRMAN AND RANKING MINORITY MEMBER OF THE FOLLOWING COMMITTEES WERE BRIEFED ON US INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA: THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEES OF BOTH HOUSES, THE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES OF BOTH HOUSE, AND THE COMMITTEES OF BOTH HOUSE WHICH HAVE

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CIA OVERSIGHT RESPONSIBILITIES. IN ADDITION, THE TWO COMMITTEES INVESTIGATING CIA ACTIVITIES (THE CHURCH AND THE PIKE COMMITTEES) WERE GIVEN THE SAME AMOUNT OF BRIEFINGS.

QUESTION:

WHY DIDN'T THE ADMINISTRATION PUBLICLY REVEAL THE U.S. ROLE EARLIER THAN IT DID?

ANSWER:

BY UNDERTAKING A COVERT ACTION OURSELVES, WE HOPED TO SIGNAL TO MOSCOW OUR DETERMINATION TO REACT TO ITS INTRUSION WHILE PROVIDING IT WITH FACESAVING OPPORTUNITY TO CUT BACK ITS INVOLVEMENT. MOREOVER, WE HAD NO WISH TO EMBARRASS THE ANGOLAN PARTIES WE WERE TRYING TO AID OR THE AFRICAN COUNTRIES WHICH HAD ASKED US TO HELP AND WITH WHICH WE HAD COLLABORATED TO MAKE OUR AID EFFECTIVE.

QUESTION:

I AGREE THAT THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA IS CAUSE FOR CONCERN. HOWEVER, INSTEAD OF INVOLVING OURSELVES IN THE WAR, WHY DON'T WE USE THE DIPLOMATIC LEVERAGE WE ALREADY HAVE IN ORDER TO PRESSURE THE SOVIETS -- IF NOT SALT, THEN CERTAINLY GRAIN SALES AND TECHNOLOGICAL EXCHANGE?

ANSWER:

WE BELIEVE THAT EFFECTIVE DIPLOMATIC LEVERAGE INCLUDES NOT SIMPLY PRESSURE EXERTED IN OTHER ASPECTS OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS, BUT SUPPORT FOR RESISTANCE ON THE GROUND AS WELL. DIPLOMATIC LEVERAGE ONLY BECOMES EFFECTIVE AT THAT POINT WHERE THE OTHER SIDE DOUBTS IT CAN WIN A MILITARY VICTORY. SUCH SUPPORT IS NECESSARY TO CONVINCE THE SOVIETS THAT OUR CONCERN ABOUT THEIR INVOLVEMENT IS GENUINE. MOREOVER, THERE ARE ASPECTS OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS IN WHICH PROGRESS SHOULD NOT BE HALTED BY OUTSIDE FACTORS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE SALT TALKS, AS I HAVE SAID, ARE NOT A BENEFIT WE CONFER ON THE SOVIET UNION, BUT SOMETHING THAT IS IN THE VITAL INTEREST OF BOTH NATIONS AS WELL AS THE WORLD. GRAIN SALES AND TECHNOLOGICAL EXCHANGE AS WELL ARE NOT SIMPLY A ONE-WAY STREET, BUT ARE IN THE INTEREST

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OF BOTH POWERS. WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY THAT CONTINUED INTERFERENCE IN ANGOLA ON THEIR PART MUST INEVITABLY AFFECT OUR OVERALL BILATERAL RELATIONS. HOWEVER, WE DO NOT CONSIDER IT IN OUR INTEREST TO ESTABLISH A PARTICULAR ASPECT OF OUR BI-

LATERAL RELATIONS AS A QUID PRO QUO FOR SOVIET COOPERATION IN ANGOLA.

QUESTION:

WHAT ECONOMIC, HUMANITARIAN, OR CULTURAL ASSISTANCE HAS THE U.S. GIVEN TO ANGOLA?

ANSWER:

AID HAS PROVIDED TRAINING FUNDS TO EACH OF THE THREE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS IN ANGOLA THROUGH A DEVELOPMENT TRAINING PROGRAM FOR PORTUGUESE SPEAKING AFRICA. THE PROGRAM IS ADMINISTERED BY THE AFRICAN AMERICAN INSTITUTE WHICH HAS SOUGHT TO FUND POST SECONDARY TRAINING FOR FIFTEEN CANDIDATES FROM EACH OF THE THREE MOVEMENTS. IN ADDITION, AID HAS PROVIDED DISASTER RELIEF IN THE FORM OF TWO GRANTS TOTALLING US DOLS. 400,000 TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS FOR USE BY THE ICRC IN ANGOLA. DISASTER REFLIEF FUNDS WERE ALSO PROVIDED TO HELP EVACUATE REFUGEES FROM ANGOLA TO PORTUGAL.

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT STANDS READY TO RESPOND TO REQUESTS FROM INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS FOR ASSISTANCE IN ANGOLA, BUT THE FIGHTING MAKES IT DIFFICULT FOR ICRC AND THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSION FOR REFUGEES TO DISTRIBUTE NEEDED SUPPLIES WITHIN ANGOLA. THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF FUTURE NEEDS IS HARD TO ESTIMATE, BUT THE UNITED STATES HAS CONSISTENTLY RESPONDED GENEROUSLY TO REQUESTS FOR REHABILITA-

TION ASSISTANCE.

QUESTION:

YOUR STATED REASON FOR INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA IS TO COUNTER THE SOVIET INVOLVEMENT THERE. YET PAST SOVIET ADVENTURES IN AFRICA HAVE SHOWN THAT THE SOVIETS OFTEN END UP ANTAGONIZING THEIR AFRICAN FRIENDS WHO ARE MORE INTERESTED IN MAINTAINING THEIR NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE THAN IN BECOMING
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SOVIET PUPPETS. ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHAUFLE SAID RECENTLY THAT HE EXPECTED THAT IN THE LONG RUN, AFRICAN NATIONALISM WOULD ASSERT ITSELF IN ANGOLA. WHY THEN DO YOU YOU MAINTAIN THAT WE MUST RESIST THE SOVIETS IN ANGOLA?

ANSWER:

WHAT MOST CONCERNS US IS NOT WHAT WILL HAPPEN IN ANGOLA IN THE LONG RUN, WHICH CAN BE VERY LONG, BUT WHAT IS HAPPENING NOW AND WHAT MAY HAPPEN IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THE IMPORTANT POINT IS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE, RIGHT NOW, INTERVENING IN A NATION FAR REMOVED FROM THEIR AREA OF SECURITY CONCERN WITH A MASSIVE SUPPLY OF ARMS AND THOUSANDS OF FOREIGN TROOPS, IN AN EFFORT TO IMPOSE A GOVERNMENT BY A MINORITY, THE MPLA, ON THE ENTIRE COUNTRY. WE CONSIDER

THIS ACTION A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT WHICH, IF LEFT UNCHALLENGED, WOULD ENCOURAGE THE SOVIETS TO MEDDLE IN OTHER COUNTRIES WHERE THEY CONSIDER CONDITIONS FAVORABLE TO THEM. WHAT DISTURBS US IS NOT THE LONG TERM OUTCOME IN ANGOLA, BUT THE EFFECT OF THE ANGOLAN SITUATION ON SOVIET AND OTHER NATIONS' PERCEPTIONS OF OUR WILL TO DRAW THE LINE AGAINST SOVIET MEDDLING FAR FROM ITS HOME TERRITORY. WE ARE ALSO CONCERNED OVER THE POTENTIALLY UNSETTLING IMPACT ON STATES NEIGHBORING ANGOLA, WITH WHICH WE HAVE CLOSE RELATIONS, OF AN MPLA VICTORY.

QUESTION:

ISN'T THIS SIMPLY A SLIGHTLY MODIFIED VERSION OF THE DISCREDITED DOMINO THEORY?

ANSWER:

WE ARE FAR FROM SUGGESTING THAT IF THE SOVIET-BACKED GROUP WINS IN ANGOLA, THIS WILL START A CHAIN REACTION OF DOMINOES ACROSS AFRICA. OBVIOUSLY, CONDITIONS NEED TO BE REASONABLY FAVORABLE FOR A SOVIET PENETRATION, AS THEY HAVE BEEN IN ANGOLA, AND IN THE MAJORITY OF COUNTRIES THEY ARE PROBABLY NOT FAVORABLE. HOWEVER, IN THOSE COUNTRIES (EVEN IF THEY ARE ONLY A FEW) WHERE CONDITIONS ARE FAVORABLE, THE SOVIETS WILL BE MORE INCLINED TO TURN THOSE CONDITIONS TO THEIR ADVANTAGE IF THEY BELIEVE THAT THE U.S. WILL NOT OBJECT.

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WE NEED TO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN SOVIET INFLUENCE AND THE POLITICAL IMPACT OF SOVIET ACTION. I WOULD AGREE THAT AFRICANS ARE RESISTANT TO OUTSIDE INFLUENCE, REGARDLESS OF THE SOURCE. BUT YOU MAY ALSO BE SURE THAT THE AFRICANS WILL DRAW APPROPRIATE CONCLUSIONS REGARDING AMERICAN POWER AND CREDIBILITY FROM OUR INEFFECTUAL EFFORTS TO ASSIST OUR FRIENDS IN ANGOLA COMPARED TO THE MASSIVE SOVIET AND CUBAN AID TO THE MPLA.

QUESTION:

NEVERTHELESS, IN BACKING THE SAME SIDE AS SOUTH AFRICA, THE U.S. HAS APPALLED AFRICANS AND LOST MUCH INFLUENCE WITH THEM; WHEREAS THE SOVIETS HAVE APPEARED IN THE ROLE OF SAVING AFRICA FROM THE SOUTH AFRICANS. WILL THIS NOT BE MORE HARMFUL TO LONG TERM U.S. INTERESTS IN AFRICA (VIS-AVIS THE SOVIETS) THAN A SOVIET-BACKED MPLA VICTORY IN ANGOLA?

ANSWER:

ONE CANNOT GENERALIZE SO EASILY ABOUT THE AFRICANS' PERCEPTION OF THE U.S. AND SOVIET ROLES. IT SHOULD NOT BE FORGOTTEN THAT 22 OF THE 46 MEMBERS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY STOOD FIRM AGAINST OAU RECOGNITION OF

THE MPLA, WHICH WAS PROPOSED BY 22 OTHER MEMBERS. BEHIND THIS FIRM STAND, WHICH WAS IN AGREEMENT WITH THE U.S. POSITION, WAS NOT ONLY AN AWARENESS THAT THE MPLA REPRESENTS JUST A MINORITY OF ANGOLANS, BUT ALSO A GENUINE AND WIDE-SPREAD APPREHENSION OVER SOVIET, AS WELL AS SOUTH AFRICAN, INTERVENTION IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF AFRICA AND OF AN AFRICAN COUNTRY. ONE CAN CONCLUDE, THEREFORE, THAT MANY AFRICAN COUNTRIES WOULD BE GREATLY DISMAYED BY A SOVIET SUCCESS IN ANGOLA AND SEVERELY DISAPPOINTED BY THE LACK OF AN EFFECTIVE U.S. RESPONSE.

QUESTION:

IN ALLYING OURSELVES WITH ZAIRE IN ANGOLA, ARE WE NOT THEREBY GIVING BACKING TO ZAIRIAN IRRIDENTIST DESIGNS ON CABINDA?

ANSWER:

NO. IN GRANTING INDEPENDENCE TO ANGOLA, PORTUGAL INCLUDED
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CABINDA AS PART OF ANGOLA. AS FAR AS THE U.S. IS CONCERNED, THEREFORE, ANY QUESTIONS REGARDING THE STATUS OF CABINDA ARE FOR THE PEOPLES OF ANGOLA TO DECIDE.

QUESTION:

ARE THE AMERICAN PEOPLE BEING LED INTO ANOTHER VIETNAM?

ANSWER:

WE DO NOT BELIEVE THE AMERICAN ACTIONS IN THE ANGOLAN WAR CAN BE EQUATED WITH WHAT WE DID, AND WHAT HAPPENED TO US, IN VIETNAM. PRESIDENT FORD HAS COMMENTED ON THIS AS I HAVE ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS.

ON DECEMBER 20, 1975, THE PRESIDENT DECLARED: "THE ISSUE IN ANGOLA IS NOT, NEVER HAS BEEN, AND NEVER WILL BE A QUESTION OF THE USE OF U.S. FORCES. THE SOLE ISSUE IS THE PROVISION OF MODEST AMOUNT OF ASSISTANCE TO OPPOSE MILITARY INTERVENTION BY TWO-EXTRA-CONTINENTAL POWERS, NAMELY THE SOVIET UNION AND CUBA."

A DAY EARLIER, I SAID: "NOBODY EVER SUGGESTED THE INTRODUCTION OF AMERICAN MILITARY FORCES." FURTHERMORE, I STATED THAT THE SUMS INVOLVED IN OUR ASSISTANCE TO THE FNLA AND UNITA AMOUNTED TO TENS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS, NOT BILLIONS OF DOLLARS. I ADDED IT WOULD BE WRONG TO CONCLUDE THAT "IF ONE APPROVES OF TENS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS, THE NEXT THING YOU KNOW IS YOU WILL HAVE SPENT US DOLS. 150 BILLION AND HAVE 500,000 TROOPS THERE."

WITH RESPECT TO ANGOLA, FROM THE VERY BEGINNING WE MADE EVERY EFFORT TO AVOID THE MISTAKES OF VIETNAM. THERE WAS NEVER ANY INTENTION TO USE U.S. MILITARY FORCES IN ANGOLA

IN EITHER AN ADVISORY OR A COMBAT ROLE. UNLIKE VIETNAM, OUR OBJECTIVE IN ANGOLA WAS A VERY LIMITED ONE, CONSISTING OF HELPING THE FNLA AND UNITA MAINTAIN ENOUGH OF A MILITARY CAPABILITY TO ENCOURAGE NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE THREE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS, AS ADVOCATED BY THE OAU.

QUESTION:

THE ADMINISTRATION CLAIMS THAT OUR INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA IS SUPPORTED BY OTHER COUNTRIES, INCLUDING OUR WESTERN
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EUROPEAN ALLIES. ARE THESE OTHER COUNTRIES ALSO CONTRIBUTING SUPPORT TO FNLA AND UNITA, OR ARE THEY SIMPLY LEAVING THE WHOLE MATTER TO THE U.S., AS IS SO OFTEN THE CASE?

ANSWER:

WE HAVE RECEIVED MUCH DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT FOR A POSITION SIMILAR TO OURS. AT THE OAU SUMMIT, 22 AFRICAN NATIONS CAME OUT IN SUPPORT OF A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY AND THE END OF ALL FOREIGN INTERVENTION BOTH OF WHICH IS WHAT THE U.S. SUPPORTS, AND DEFEATED AN ATTEMPT TO HAVE THE OAU RECOGNIZE THE MPLA AS THE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT. AS FOR

WESTERN EUROPE, BRITAIN, FRANCE AND WEST GERMANY, AS WELL AS THE NINE MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY GENERALLY, MADE DIPLOMATIC APPROACHES TO AFRICAN NATIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE MODERATE AFRICAN POSITION.

QUESTION:

IF THE MPLA WINS THE WAR, ESTABLISHES EFFECTIVE CONTROL OVER ANGOLA, AND OBTAINS THE RECOGNITION OF MOST NATIONS AROUND THE WORLD, WHAT WILL THE U.S. DO? WHAT WILL WE DO IF CUBAN TROOPS AND RUSSIAN ADVISORS REMAIN IN ANGOLA?

ANSWER:

WE CANNOT COMMIT OURSELVES BEFOREHAND TO A COURSE OF ACTION THAT WILL DEPEND UPON MANY FACTORS. IF MPLA IS IN EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF THE COUNTRY, AND IF THE CUBANS AND RUSSIANS HAVE DEPARTED, THEN WE WILL AT SOME POINT CONSIDER THE QUESTION OF RECOGNITION. IF THE RUSSIAN ADVISORS, AND PARTICULARLY THE CUBAN TROOPS, REMAIN, IT WOULD OF COURSE BE MUCH MORE DIFFICULT.

APPROVE DISAPPROVE

CLEARANCE; AF/WSCHAUFEE

. P:FWISNER

 H:KBJENKINS

; S/P:DPETTERSON

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